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A Response to Goodwin Liu  
 Professor Liu’s article1 convincingly shows that the Fourteenth 
Amendment can be read, and has been read in the past, to confer a positive 
right on all citizens to a high-quality public education and to place a correlative 
duty on the legislative branches of both state and federal government to 
provide for that education. Specifically, the United States Congress has an 
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, Liu argues, 
to ensure that the public education provided by states meets minimal standards 
so that citizens possess the competencies requisite to meaningful participation 
in civic life. Liu’s argument is not simply that Congress may, within the grant 
of power of the Fourteenth Amendment, address educational inequality, if it 
sees fit to do so (thus withstanding federalism challenges). Rather, Liu’s claim 
is that the states, and Congress, jointly must do so. The Constitution imposes a 
duty on government to educate, and confers a positive right to an education 
upon the citizenry. A decent education, Liu argues, is part of what it means to 
be a citizen under the United States Constitution. 
I applaud the constitutional and the moral ambition of this piece. Liu’s 
paper is a stellar example of what I hope will prove to be an emerging genre: an 
exploration of the possible meaning of constitutional phrases in our 
constitutional text and history, as viewed through the lens of legislative 
purposes and legislative ends. The article is a study of constitutional politics 
rather than constitutional law; it is a study of the effect of constitutionalism on 
legislative decision-making rather than the effect of constitutionalism on 
adjudicated constitutional law. I hope that this article proves fecund—that it 
inspires not only criticism but also like-minded efforts to improve other aspects 
of our public life through a capacious view of our representative branch’s 
constitutional obligations. 
 
1.  Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006).  
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Liu’s argument has two somewhat undeveloped implications that I believe 
are worth exploring, one jurisprudential and one practical. Let me begin with 
the jurisprudential. As Liu acknowledges, his reading of the Constitution’s 
Citizenship Clause goes against the grain of now-conventional Fourteenth 
Amendment wisdom. First, he reads that Clause to convey positive rights, and 
finds support for that interpretation in the similar readings of the Clause by 
authoritative others. Second, he reads the Fourteenth Amendment as directed 
to Congress as well as to courts, and as imposing duties upon Congress to act.  
If Liu is right, then neither the Court’s nor most commentators’ 
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment fully capture the meaning of the 
constitutional text and history. Liu therefore puts forward his historical 
analysis as a corrective to contemporary mis-readings. We are wrong, he 
suggests, to assume so confidently that the Constitution is one of negative 
rights only, that the Citizenship Clause confers no positive rights on citizens, 
and that the legal community that produced the Reconstruction Amendments 
had no sense of the connections between education and citizenship. To the 
contrary: at least some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers understood 
the centrality of education to citizenship, and some viewed the Fourteenth 
Amendment as imposing obligations upon Congress and the states to provide 
education. And we are wrong, Liu claims, to regard the Reconstruction 
Amendments as a directive to courts to strike errant legislation, rather than as a 
prod to the legislator to enact law that promotes liberty, equality, and 
citizenship. At least, Liu argues, we are wrong to think that our contemporary 
understanding of the Constitution is the only possible understanding, or that it 
is unequivocally the understanding that was shared by all of the Framers of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. 
Liu does not, however, address the underlying jurisprudence of his 
historical reconstruction—an omission that may have consequences for the 
plausibility of his reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. He does not, for 
example, consider that the Reconstruction Era actors may have had a different 
jurisprudential understanding of the meaning of constitutional law and of the 
role of the judiciary in enforcing it. As Larry Kramer,2 Mark Tushnet,3 and a 
number of other historians have argued, it is quite possible that lawyers of the  
Reconstruction era had a different “constitutional jurisprudence” from that 
which governs modern judicial understandings of constitutional guarantees. If 
Kramer and Tushnet are right about that, then interpretations that made sense 
to the Reconstruction generation may make much less sense to us today. It 
 
2.  LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 214-15 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term — Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 117-20 (2001).  
3.  MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1990). 
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may be that if we are to reinvigorate the Reconstruction vision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship, and of the role of education 
in achieving that guarantee, we will need to reinvigorate some forgotten 
jurisprudential ideas as well. 
Let me sketch out the contrast I have in mind, and its implications for 
contemporary constitutional thought, very briefly. Perhaps it was possible 
during Reconstruction (and perhaps at the Founding as well) to speak of the 
Constitution as a document that guided the hand of Congress as well as 
restrained it, that spoke to congressional obligations to act as well as 
congressional obligations to refrain from acting, and that expressed a “law” for 
legislation addressed to the legislator. The Constitution, it could still at least be 
said then, had a political, as opposed to a purely legal existence: it was 
addressed to the political branches no less than the judicial. It was possible, 
given such an understanding of what Tushnet now calls the Constitution’s 
“political law,”4 to understand the Fourteenth Amendment as a political 
directive to the political branches to do certain things with their power, rather 
than a legal directive to the judicial branch to restrain legislative power through 
enforcing negative rights. It might have been possible to understand the 
Constitution as setting forth a moral direction for politics, rather than as a law 
meant to relentlessly restrain and check legislative power.  
It is much harder for us, today, to see the Constitution as such a document. 
Rather, for reasons I have discussed at length elsewhere,5 we tend instead to 
see the constitution as ordinary law, and hence constitutional questions—such 
as whether Congress is constitutionally obligated to ensure that the States 
provide a minimally adequate education to all citizens—as questions of 
“ordinary law.” Constitutional law tells us what the relevant actors – 
legislators, executives, and so forth – may and may not do, just as commercial 
law tells us what sellers, buyers, and holders of secured loans or commercial 
paper may and may not do. We view the Constitution, on this jurisprudential 
scheme, as a source of ordinary law, rather than as a source of political wisdom, 
inspiration, or guidance. Further, and importantly, all of us now being legal 
realists, we view these questions of ordinary law—including constitutional 
law—as questions for courts to decide. Constitutional questions, then, 
including those of the sort Liu raises, become by definition questions of law for 
courts to decide. 
How does all of this affect the fragile case for a purported right to a 
minimally adequate education? If constitutional rights and duties are those 
 
4.  Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (2006). 
5.  Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2006); Robin West, 
Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127 (2006). 
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rights and duties which are a part of law, and law is that which is discovered, 
expressed, and enforced by courts, then it is not at all surprising that 
constitutional rights have been limited to those that are negative, and 
correlatively, that legislative duties grounded in constitutionalism have 
virtually disappeared. As a practical matter, courts cannot enforce positive 
rights; as a jurisprudential matter, they are disinclined to do so. Courts exist to 
do legal justice between parties, not to provide social goods, whether or not 
those goods are constitutionally required. Given our contemporary 
jurisprudential identification of law with judicial utterance, it will accordingly 
be exceedingly difficult for modern constitutionalists to read the constitutional 
text to include a positive right to an education and an affirmative duty of 
legislators to provide one. 
But note what generates this conclusion: it is our jurisprudence, not our 
constitutional text, history, or law. We have come to view constitutional law as 
adjudicated law. But this is a limited view. If we understand the Constitution 
to mean (only) the law enforced and interpreted by courts, then we limit our 
understanding of justice to those types of justice that are discoverable and 
enforceable by courts. Distributive and social justice will not survive such an 
understanding. For a host of familiar reasons, courts will not find positive 
rights to welfare, education, health, and so on in the Constitution. Because we 
now so identify our sense of justice with the mandates of the Constitution, our 
constitutional jurisprudence, in a very tangible way, limits our moral ambitions 
for a just polity. 
It is therefore not surprising that Professor Liu begins his piece with a 
process-oriented argument to the effect that the Constitution can and should 
be read as a document directed toward Congress, not the courts, and as a set of 
duties for legislators. He is right to do so: if we begin with the premise that the 
Constitution contains a positive right to an education, then we must indeed at 
least suspend belief in—if not jettison—our constitutional jurisprudence. But 
here, we have a problem. A full and alternative jurisprudence has yet to be fully 
articulated by those who wish to read the Constitution both faithfully and 
capaciously so as to include positive rights, such as a right to education. We do 
not have a modern jurisprudence that can embrace the concept of a 
Constitution that is read as a political document, for and by the political 
branch, yet nevertheless is also in some sense law.  Such a jurisprudence may 
well be a necessary pre-condition for a Constitution that can plausibly be read 
as containing positive rights of citizens and corresponding duties of legislators, 
including the right to an education. 
My jurisprudential point, then, is simply that if we are going to take 
seriously the possibility of a “legislated Constitution”—a Constitution directed 
to, and therefore interpreted and enforced by legislatures—we will have to first 
develop a robust jurisprudence that can support it. That jurisprudence in turn 
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will have to rediscover a concept of law that has been lost to us for at least a 
half-century: an idea of law as a moral prod to better politics rather than an 
idea of law as merely a tool with which courts may de-legitimize the results of 
politics. 
My second point is entirely practical. A Constitution directed at 
legislatures, and intended for legislative interpretation and implementation, 
requires legislators equipped, willing, and desirous to so receive it. We don’t 
currently have anything even remotely resembling such a legislative assembly 
at either the federal or state level; for a very long time we have not delegated 
the work of constitutional interpretation to Congress, and it shows. There are a 
handful of constitutionally savvy senators—Joseph Biden, Orrin Hatch, Barack 
Obama—but there is no institutional sense in Congress that senators or 
representatives should be interested and engaged readers, interpreters, and 
implementers of the constitutional text. Nor do our representatives seek out 
qualified staff to help them develop constitutionally guided law. While we 
expect constitutional wisdom, reason, moral astuteness, and moral ambition 
from judges, we expect horse trading at best from Congress. Courts reason 
toward justice, with an eye on liberty and equality and citizenship for all, while 
Congress acts and on the basis of preference, whim, good reasons, bad reasons, 
or no reasons. For the sort of deliberative, morally ennobling politics we 
habitually identify with a highly ethical form of practical reason, we go to the 
courts. 
For Liu’s normative proposal to get off the ground, we must reverse those 
expectations. In that task— unlike so much in our current political milieu—we 
in the law schools might actually have some power to effect change. Law 
schools routinely send off wonderful graduates to judicial clerkships. Why 
shouldn’t we likewise aspire to send some of our outstanding graduates to 
senatorial and congressional clerkships? If senators and representatives ought 
to be reading, interpreting, and implementing the Constitution, perhaps they 
could hire young lawyers just out of law school to aid the effort. It might prove 
to be a felicitous association.  
A lawmaker, no less than a judge, could benefit from the educated advice 
that a law graduate could bring to the task. If my vision were ever to come to 
pass, the conscientious legislator would look to the Constitution not to answer 
the question, “What is the law?” but rather the question, “What should the law 
be?” The legislator, like the judge, must be mindful of the past when 
answering that question; nevertheless, this question is different from the one 
the judge asks. Law graduates could bring idealism, enthusiasm, intelligence, 
and tremendous learning to the legislator’s task of constitutional 
interpretation.  
And what would be in it for the graduates – most of whom, after all, will 
not ever be legislators? First, it’s worth noting that the vast majority of law 
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graduates now clerking or aspiring to clerk for judges will never be judges. 
Surely, a one-year internship in a congressional office, with the responsibility 
for ensuring that the legislative product is based, in part, on a generous and 
faithful interpretation of the Constitution, would provide as much and possibly 
more practical knowledge than a one- or two-year clerkship with a judge. 
Lawyers should know the ins and outs of the legislative process no less than of 
the appellate process. It’s not unreasonable to suppose that lawyers who have 
had experience at either the state or federal level assembling a bill, drafting a 
bill, and discussing its constitutionality would be as welcome an addition to 
any number of firms and practices as lawyers with one year of experience 
writing memoranda for appellate court judges. 
Finally, our law might benefit. Look just to the “right to an education” that 
Professor Liu champions. Constitutional lawyers have achieved victories in 
courts for the occasional learning disabled student, the racially segregated 
school district, and the economically distressed high school. But legislative 
victories on these issues, and for these citizens, if informed by the legislated 
Constitution, might hold out greater promise still. And no matter what 
happens in the courtroom, senators and representatives themselves could be 
inspired by the moral aspirations of their law clerks to reach for a generous, 
capacious, and progressive understanding of constitutionalism, such as that 
depicted in Goodwin Liu’s remarkable article, to guide their labors. 
 
Robin West is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
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